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Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for an Amendment to
a Juvenile's Right to a Parent, Guardian, or Custodian During a
Police Interrogation After State v. Oglesby*
"But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for
the police in such a contest [as a custodial interrogation]. "
"[O]ne of the most common reasons cited by teenage false
confessors is the belief that by confessing, they would be able to
go home. "2
On September 10, 2002, Jaamall Denaris Oglesby was arrested
by the Winston-Salem Police Department for a series of robberies.3
Jaamall was sixteen years old4 at the time and was later diagnosed
with "a major mental disorder and the adaptive behavior level of a
mentally retarded person."5 The next day, while Jaamall was still in
custody, police officers interrogated him about the robberies in
question and also about a murder that occurred during the early
morning of September 10, 2002.6 Jaamall testified that the police
* Copyright © 2008 by Cara A. Gardner.
1. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).
2. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891,969 (2004).
3. Brief for State-Appellee at 3, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819
(2007) (No. 683PA05). The robberies in question involved two gun-point robberies of
convenience stores on September 7 and 8 of 2002. See Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 552, 649
S.E.2d at 820. On November 2, 2003, a grand jury indicted Jaamall for two counts of
robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id. Jaamall eventually pled guilty to both charges on
May 24, 2004, but the trial court postponed sentencing him until after his trial for three
remaining charges. Id.
4. Despite the fact that juveniles who are sixteen or older are tried as adults in North
Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2007), the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has held that the term "juvenile" includes all individuals who have not reached their
eighteenth birthday for the purpose of the right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian
present during a police interrogation. See State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 9-10, 305 S.E.2d
685, 691 (1983). The Supreme Court reiterated their holding in Fincher on this point in
Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 555, 648 S.E.2d at 822 n.1.
5. Record at 10, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819 (2007) (COA04-
1534).
6. Brief for State-Appellee at 1-2, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819
(2007) (No. 683PA05). The murder in question was of Scott Jester, who was working for a
cleaning service at Copeland's restaurant in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, during the
early morning hours of September 10, 2002. Id. at 3. Jester worked with Ron Owens,
whose car they used to drive to various job sites. Id. After finishing his portion of the job,
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officers told him that he "could not leave[,] ... had to talk to
detectives[, and] ... did not need an attorney present."7 Jaamall also
testified that when police officers gave him the rights waiver, they
told him that he would be prosecuted and given the maximum
sentence if he did not sign it.8 The officers advised Jaamall that if he
simply told them "what they wanted to hear," he would "get less time
and some charges might be dropped."9  Jaamall signed the rights
waiver and admitted to his involvement in the robberies in question
but denied he committed the murder.10
After being in custody for more than twenty-six hours, Jaamall
finally made an incriminating statement indicating that he had
committed the murder in question.' Before making that statement,
Jaamall asked to speak to his aunt, Cheryl Hairston.'2 Because
Jaamall's mother was not able to take care of him at times, Cheryl
Owens discovered that both Jester and his car were missing. Id. Jester's body was
discovered later that morning by the side of Interstate 40 with three gunshot wounds in the
back of his head. Id. at 4-5. Owens' stolen car was later discovered and returned to
Owens. Id. at 6. Jaamall, Robert Manisfield Davis, Antwan James, and Sarah Cranford
were all investigated for involvement in the kidnapping and murder of Jester and the theft
of Owens' car. Id. at 5.
7. Record at 11, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819 (2007) (COA04-
1534).
8. Id. at 11.
9. Id.
10. Brief for State-Appellee at 1-2, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819
(2007) (No. 683PA05). Jaamall stated that on the morning of September 10, 2002, he and
three companions, Sarah Cranford, Robert Manisfeld Davis, and Antwan James, decided
to rob a store. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 7, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648
S.E.2d 819 (2007) (COA04-1534). According to Jaamall, Davis had a gun and they all
drove to Copeland's restaurant where Davis forced Scott Jester to get in Jester's car and
then gave the gun to Jaamall. Id. Davis drove the car on Interstate 40 while Jester and
Jaamall sat in the backseat. Id. Eventually, Davis stopped the car by the side of the road
and told everyone to get out. Id. Davis then told Jaamall to shoot Jester, and when
Jaamall refused, Davis grabbed Jaamall. Id. The gun discharged when Davis grabbed
Jaamall, and Davis then took the gun and fired two additional shots into the back of
Jester's head. Id.
11. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819
(2007) (COA04-1534). An incriminating statement is one that "tends to establish the guilt
of the accused." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1445 (8th ed. 2004). The statement
consisted of a taped interview that police recorded after questioning Jaamall in an initial
non-recorded interview. Brief for State-Appellee at 4, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648
S.E.2d 819 (2007) (No. 683PA05). During this statement, Jaamall said that he shot Jester
but "didn't mean to." Brief for State-Appellee at 5, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648
S.E.2d 819 (2007) (No. 683PA05).
12. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819
(2007) (COA04-1534). The record is unclear about the exact manner in which Jaamall
made this request. In terms of timing, Jaamall spontaneously made his request
immediately before the police began a taped interview that he agreed to do. Brief for
State-Appellee at 2, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819 (2007) (No. 683PA05).
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had played an important role in raising Jaamall. 13 Cheryl considered
herself to be "a mother figure" to Jaamall.14 However, without asking
any questions about Jaamall's relationship to his aunt, police officers
simply told Jaamall that he could not speak to her until after he made
a statement. 5 After he made the statement, Jaamall was allowed to
call his aunt. 16 Cheryl testified that Jaamall told her that he had told
the detectives what they wanted to hear so that he could call her.'
Jaamall was eventually convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole." Jaamall's ordeal is
particularly disturbing given that the North Carolina General Statutes
provide that juveniles have a "right to have a parent, guardian, or
custodian present during questioning."' 9 However, as Jaamall's case
progressed through the court system, his statutory right to a guardian
or custodian was repeatedly construed against him, and the courts
consistently ignored the fact that the police officers did not have
enough information at the time they denied Jaamall's request to
determine whether Cheryl was Jaamall's guardian or custodian.20
This Recent Development will argue that, in light of Oglesby, the
North Carolina General Assembly should amend the applicable
statute to require police officers to determine whether an individual
whom a juvenile requests to be present during an interrogation is a
parent, guardian, or custodian. It will first explain how Oglesby
establishes that police officers are not required to determine whether
an adult a juvenile requests to speak to during an interrogation is a
guardian or custodian. Next, it will describe three policy reasons why
police officers should be required to make such a determination: not
doing so (1) fails to protect the rights of juveniles; (2) creates a bias
against juveniles who live in non-traditional homes; and (3)
undermines the North Carolina General Assembly's well-founded
policy of special protection for juveniles. As to the first reason, this
Recent Development will explain how not requiring a determination
13. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 640 S.E.2d 810
(2007) (COA04-1534).
14. State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 556, 648 S.E.2d 819, 822 (2007).
15. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5-6, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d
819 (2007) (COA04-1534).
16. Record at 12, State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819 (2007) (COA04-
1534).
17. Id. at 12.
18. Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 553, 648 S.E.2d at 820.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(a) (2005). See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text for a full discussion of the statute.
20. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text for a full discussion of how the
North Carolina courts construed Jaamall's case.
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about the requested adult permits police officers to behave in a
manner that may violate a juvenile's rights during an interrogation.
The discussion of the second reason will describe how creating a bias
against juveniles who live in non-traditional homes defeats one of the
purposes of the Juvenile Code, namely, to provide uniform and equal
procedures for all juveniles. Regarding the third reason, this piece
will describe why the North Carolina General Assembly's policy of
special protection for juveniles is well-founded and should be upheld
by requiring police officers to determine whether an individual whom
a juvenile requests to be present during a custodial interrogation is a
guardian or custodian. This Recent Development will conclude by
suggesting a statutory amendment requiring police officers to cease
an interrogation to determine whether an adult requested by a
juvenile is a guardian or custodian.
As Jaamall's story indicates, juveniles are especially vulnerable
to police intimidation tactics 21 and very unlikely to understand their
Miranda rights.22 In recognition of these unique vulnerabilities, the
General Statutes of North Carolina provide special protection for
juveniles during interrogation. A juvenile who has been taken into
police custody not only has the standard Miranda rights23 but also the
21. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. The term "Miranda rights" refers to
the constitutionally protected right against compelled self-incrimination as articulated in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Specifically, North Carolina statute provides:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent; (2) That any statement the
juvenile does make can be and may be used against the juvenile; ... (4) That the
juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for
the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants representation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(a) (2005). See infra note 35 for the complete text of the
statute. These enumerated rights mirror the rights of adults in police custody. Miranda
requires that prior to any custodial interrogation, a person must be warned that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Statements made during a custodial interrogation are only
admissible in court if the prosecution proves that Miranda warnings were given and the
individual "knowingly and intelligently" waived her rights. Id. See generally E.H. Shopler,
Annotation, Necessity of Informing Suspect of Rights Under Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, Prior to Police Interrogation, 10 A.L.R.3D 1054 (outlining American
jurisdictions' application of Miranda and providing a general discussion of the holding).
The Supreme Court of the United States determined a year after Miranda that the same
rights applied to juveniles. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) ("We conclude that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it
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"right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during
questioning., 24  A juvenile must be informed of all of these rights
prior to questioning.' Additionally, "[i]f the juvenile indicates in any
manner and at any stage of questioning pursuant to this section that
the juvenile does not wish to be questioned further, the officer shall
cease questioning. ' 26
Before Jaamall's murder trial, he moved to suppress his
statement made during the interrogation on the grounds that his right
to a parent, guardian, or custodian was violated when the
interrogation continued despite the fact that he asked to speak to his
aunty.2  After a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress based on the finding that Jaamall's aunt was not his parent,
guardian, or custodian.218 The trial court did not address the fact that
the police officers did not have enough information to determine that
Cheryl was not Jaamall's guardian or custodian at the time they
denied his request to speak to her.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial
court's decision by holding that "[b]ecause defendant's aunt was not a
parent, custodian, or guardian, he had no right to her presence during
questioning. 219 Because Jaamall conceded in his appellate brief that
his aunt was not a parent or a custodian, the court focused on the
determination of whether the aunt was a guardian.3" The court
defined guardianship as "legal authority conferred by the government
upon the guardian as to a minor" and, importantly, noted that legal
authority can be conferred by any governmental agency that
is with respect to adults."). See generally W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Applicability of rules of
evidence in juvenile delinquency proceeding, 43 A.L.R.2D 1128 (providing a general
discussion of criminal procedures involving juveniles in American jurisdictions).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(a) (2005).
25. Id.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(c) (2005). To some extent, this mirrors language in
Miranda, which states that if the defendant "indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (1966) (emphasis added). Miranda also
requires that "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Id. at 473-74
(emphasis added).
27. State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 552, 648 S.E.2d 819, 820 (2007). A violation of the
right to speak to a parent, guardian, or custodian will result in suppression of statements
made by the defendant during an interrogation. See infra note 47.
28. Id. at 552-53, 648 S.E.2d at 820. The trial court also found that defendant's
request to speak to his aunt " 'was not a time specific request,' nor did defendant say he
would not speak with the officers until he was allowed to place the call." Id. at 553, 648
S.E.2d at 820.
29. State v. Oglesby, 174 N.C. App. 658, 663, 622 S.E.2d 152, 156 (2005).
30. Id. at 662, 622 S.E.2d at 155.
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acknowledges directly or indirectly that the person has lawful
authority over the minor.3" For example, a local school system would
be indirectly acknowledging an adult's authority over a minor if the
school allowed the adult to enroll the minor in school. Again, the
court did not address the fact that the police officers did not have
enough information to determine that Cheryl was not Jaamall's
guardian at the time they denied his request to speak to her.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina accepted the case on
discretionary review,32 and the majority affirmed the ruling by the
court of appeals that the trial court did not err in denying Jaamall's
motion to suppress his incriminating statement since Cheryl was not
Jaamall's "guardian."33 Consistent with the trial court and the court
of appeals, the majority did not consider the fact that the police
officers did not have enough information to determine that Cheryl
was not Jaamall's guardian at the time they denied his request to
speak to her.
The court's silence on this issue establishes that police officers
are not required to determine whether an adult a juvenile requests to
speak to during an interrogation is a guardian or custodian. While
North Carolina General Statute § 7B-2101 provides general
interrogation procedures for a juvenile, the statute does not provide
any procedure for a circumstance in which a juvenile asks to speak to
an adult who is not immediately identifiable as a parent, guardian, or
custodian.34 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has interpreted a
31. Id.
32. Id. at 551, 648 S.E.2d at 819.
33. Id. at 552, 648 S.E.2d at 820.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101 (2005) provides as follows:
(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:
(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;
(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used against
the juvenile;
(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian
present during questioning; and
(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will
be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants
representation.
(b) When the juvenile is less than 14 years of age, no in-custody admission or
confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless the
confession or admission was made in the presence of the juvenile's parent,
guardian, custodian, or attorney. If an attorney is not present, the parent,
guardian, or custodian as well as the juvenile must be advised of the juvenile's
rights as set out in subsection (a) of this section; however, a parent, guardian, or
custodian may not waive any right on behalf of the juvenile.
1690 [Vol. 86
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juvenile's statutory right to a parent, guardian, or custodian as subject
to the same protections as an adult's right to an attorney.35 These
protections require that just as interrogation of an adult must cease if
the adult requests to speak to an attorney, so must interrogation of a
juvenile also cease if the juvenile asks to speak to a parent, guardian,
or custodian.36 However, before Oglesby, the North Carolina courts
had not been presented with a situation in which a juvenile asked to
speak to an individual who was not immediately identifiable as a
guardian or custodian. The question remained as to whether police
officers must cease interrogation to determine whether the requested
individual is a guardian or custodian, or if police officers could merely
deny the request and let the courts sort it out later.
Oglesby presented this exact situation: Jaamall asked to speak to
his aunt, an adult who was not immediately identifiable as a guardian
or custodian. This provided the courts an opportunity to speak on the
proper procedure when a juvenile requests an adult whose legal
relationship to the juvenile is unclear. However, instead of
addressing this issue, the courts remained steadfastly focused on
making a determination after the fact regarding whether the
requested individual was actually a guardian or custodian.37 Justice
Patricia Timmons-Goodson alone recognized the problem and
suggested in a dissenting opinion that a proper test would focus on
what the officers knew about the requested individual's status at the
time of the juvenile's denial to speak with the person." She stated
that "[a] test centering on the circumstances of the aunt as known to
the detectives during the interrogation, rather than following a
subsequent legal determination, fits better with the stated objectives
(c) If the juvenile indicates in any manner and at any stage of questioning pursuant
to this section that the juvenile does not wish to be questioned further, the officer
shall cease questioning.
(d) Before admitting into evidence any statement resulting from custodial
interrogation, the court shall find that the juvenile knowingly, willingly, and
understandingly waived the juvenile's rights.
This statute was enacted in 1999 when the legislature updated the Juvenile Code, but the
exact wording of this particular part of the Code has been the same since at least 1979. See
supra note 23 for a discussion of the applicability of Miranda rights to juveniles.
35. State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 106, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1986), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001) ("We hold that the
juvenile's right ... to have a parent present during custodial interrogation[] is entitled to
similar protection [as an adult's right to have an attorney present].").
36. Id. at 107, 343 S.E.2d at 521; State v. Hunt, 64 N.C. App. 81, 86, 306 S.E.2d 846,
850, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 824, 310 S.E.2d 354 (1983).
37. See Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 555-56, 648 S.E.2d at 822.
38. Id. at 556-59, 648 S.E.2d at 823-24 (Timmons-Goodson, J. dissenting).
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of the Juvenile Code."39  Under such a test, Jaamall's confession
would be inadmissible since the police were not "aware of the aunt's
precise legal status when they chose to press ahead in their
interrogation."'  Justice Timmons-Goodson argues that this kind of
test is preferable to the majority's opinion in Oglesby which
effectively encourages improper conduct by police officers.4 ' She
notes that the majority's reasoning is akin to admitting a statement
after the police denied a request to speak to an attorney if the
requested attorney turned out to be improperly licensed as a result of
delinquency in Bar dues.42 While the Supreme Court of North
Carolina was free to embrace this kind of test, it chose not to do so.
Therefore, this decision establishes that police officers do not need to
make a formal determination regarding the legal status of a requested
individual, but can merely deny the request, continue the
interrogation, and let the courts sort it out later.
As Justice Timmons-Goodson's dissent indicates, not requiring
police officers to determine whether an adult that a juvenile requests
during an interrogation is a parent, guardian, or custodian is
potentially harmful to juveniles. First, the policy permits police
officers to behave in a manner that is likely to violate a juvenile's
right to speak to a guardian or custodian during an interrogation.
Specifically, if a juvenile asks for someone who is actually a guardian
or custodian, but not immediately identifiable as such, police officers
may simply deny the request and continue the interrogation.
Guardians or custodians who are not immediately identifiable as such
include anyone who the juvenile would not refer to as "mom" or
"dad," such as an aunt or grandparent. Failure to identify an adult as
a guardian or custodian is not only possible, but especially likely,
given the prevalence of juveniles living with a non-traditional
caregiver in North Carolina. Estimates indicate that 201,356 juveniles
in North Carolina are not living with their parents.43 This translates
to approximately 10.3% of the entire juvenile population in North
Carolina.' Of the juveniles who do not live with their parents, 83.3%
39. Id. at 559, 648 S.E.2d at 824.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 558-59, 648 S.E.2d at 824.
42. Id. at 559, 648 S.E.2d at 824.
43. U.S. Census Bureau, Children and the Households They Live in: 2000, Census
2000 Special Reports, at 4 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/
censr-14.pdf.
44. Id.
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of them live with relatives, while only 2.9% live with foster parents. 45
Since foster parents are court-appointed guardians, police are likely
to be able to immediately identify a request for a foster parent as a
request for a guardian. However, a request for a relative who
qualifies as a guardian is not likely to be immediately identifiable to
police officers as a request for a legal guardian since juveniles will
probably ask for "my aunt" or "my grandfather." Because police may
deny these kinds of requests under Oglesby without further
investigation,46 the case allows officers to behave in a manner that is
likely to violate a juvenile's right to speak to a guardian or custodian.
Of course, a conscientious police officer would determine
whether a requested individual is actually a guardian or custodian in
order to avoid the possibility of a confession being barred from
evidence at trial. The appellate courts of North Carolina have
repeatedly held that if a juvenile is denied the right to speak to a
parent, guardian, or custodian during a custodial interrogation, then
any statements made by the defendant during the interrogation must
be suppressed at trial.47  Therefore, simply asking a few questions
about a requested adult during the interrogation of the juvenile would
help to ensure that a confession would be admissible in court. Doing
so would also be beneficial for judicial economy as it would
potentially decrease the number of pre-trial hearings regarding the
validity of a confession.
However, there is no guarantee that officers will be conscientious
about such a detail, especially when they are likely to be focused on
the ultimate goal of getting a confession. 8 Because detectives are
45. Id. The remaining 13.8% of juveniles in North Carolina live with other "non-
relatives" such as a roommate or unmarried partner, by themselves, or with a spouse. Id.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
47. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 108, 343 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1986), abrogated
on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001); State v.
Branham, 153 N.C. App. 91, 99, 569 S.E.2d 24, 29 (2002) (holding that a juvenile
defendant's confession must be suppressed because the defendant was denied his right to a
parent after he invoked that right during a police interrogation); see also State v. Hunt, 64
N.C. App. 81, 86, 306 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1983) (holding that continuing an interrogation
despite a juvenile's request to speak to a parent was "a clear and direct violation of
Miranda").
These holdings are an extension of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
which excludes not only evidence that is illegally obtained but also all evidence that
directly results from illegally obtained evidence. See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence
§ 633 (1994).
48. See Saul M. Kassin, et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report
Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383-84 (2007) ("The
stated objective of interrogation is to move a presumed guilty suspect from denial to
admission.").
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mainly measured by their capacity to solve cases, the motivation is
strong to avoid any unnecessary roadblocks to obtaining a
confession. 49  Halting an interrogation to determine whether a
requested individual is a guardian or custodian may slow the pace of
the interrogation and also affect the power dynamic the officer is
trying to establish. Commentators have described standard
interrogation techniques as a "two-step psychological process" in
which the police officer first tries to convince the suspect that he has
no way out and then tries to persuade the suspect that his best option
is to confess.50 Ceasing the interrogation in order to examine a
juvenile's request for an adult may diminish the suspect's sense that
she is trapped, thus slowing the process of getting a confession.5'
Additionally, the presence of a relative or friend is often a
particularly large roadblock to attaining an admission of guilt, as a
friendly third party can intervene and shield some of the
psychological pressure officers often use to obtain confessions."
Therefore, when an officer is confronted with a situation in which a
juvenile has requested an individual who is not immediately
identifiable as a parent, guardian, or custodian, the officer is likely to
simply deny the request. This denial may violate the juvenile's right
to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during the
interrogation if the requested individual is actually a parent, guardian,
or custodian. While it is true that requiring police officers to make
determinations as to whether a requested individual is actually a
guardian or custodian may be inconvenient and slow down the pace
of the interrogation, it is a small price to pay to ensure that juveniles'
rights are protected and all relevant evidence is available for
admission at trial.
In addition to failing to adequately protect a juvenile's rights, the
current law as established by Oglesby53 also creates a bias against
juveniles who live in non-traditional homes with someone other than
a parent. This defeats one of the enumerated purposes of the
Juvenile Code. The North Carolina General Assembly explicitly
states that part of the purpose of the Juvenile Code is "[t]o provide
49. See id. at 384.
50. Id.
51. See David L. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J.
PUB. L. 25, 38-39 (1965) (explaining how the interrogation process is designed to strip the
subject of every psychological advantage and induce him to feel isolated and anxious).
52. Id. at 43 (discussing how the presence of a relative or friend complicates the
interrogation process).
53. For a discussion of the policy established in Oglesby, see supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
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uniform procedures that assure fairness and equity."'  Therefore, the
General Assembly must have intended for juvenile proceedings to be
essentially equal for juveniles cared for in traditional homes by their
parents and for those cared for in non-traditional homes by relatives
or others. However, the current state of the law under Oglesby
distinctly disadvantages juveniles who live in non-traditional homes.
The reason a juvenile in a custodial interrogation has a right to
the presence of a parent, guardian, or custodian is presumably so that
the adult may assist in protecting the juvenile's rights.55 During an
interrogation, a juvenile who lives in a traditional home with her
parents is able to ask for "my mom" or "my dad." Because such a
request refers on its face to a parent,56 police officers will be forced to
cease the interrogation immediately in order to provide the requested
parent's presence to the juvenile.57 However, a juvenile who lives in a
non-traditional home with someone other than a parent is not able to
ask for a parent because the parents are either unwilling or unable to
care for the juvenile. Therefore, a juvenile in a non-traditional home
will have to ask for a guardian or custodian in order to assert his
right.58 A guardian or custodian is likely not to be immediately
identifiable as such. For instance, the guardian or custodian may be a
grandparent, uncle, or aunt. If an individual is not immediately
identifiable as a guardian or custodian, Oglesby allows police officers
to deny the request without making a determination as to whether the
requested individual is actually a guardian or custodian. 9 This
disadvantages juveniles who live in non-traditional homes and then
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1500(4) (2007).
55. Part of the purpose of the Juvenile Code is to "protect the constitutional rights of
juveniles," id., and the right to a parent, guardian, or custodian is listed within the same
section as a juvenile's constitutionally protected rights against self-incrimination. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101(a) (2007).
56. Juveniles have a right to a parent during an interrogation. § 7B-2101(a)(3).
57. Once a juvenile defendant has requested the presence of an attorney, parent,
guardian, or custodian, the defendant may not be interrogated further "until [counsel,
parent, guardian, or custodian] has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.' State v.
Branham, 153 N.C. App. 91, 95, 569 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2002) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 626, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1406, 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 636 (1986) (alterations in
original))." State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 557, 648 S.E.2d 819, 823 (2007) (Timmons-
Goodson, J., dissenting).
58. § 7B-2101 (a)(3).
59. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. Of course, if the individual is
actually a guardian or custodian, the courts will establish the right later, but that does not
change the fact that a police officer may very well deny a juvenile's request to speak to an
individual who is not immediately identifiable as a guardian or custodian at the time of the
interrogation and simply allow the courts to sort it out later. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
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forces them to wade through the court system to establish a right that
should have been respected during the interrogation. Juveniles who
live in non-traditional homes are already likely to have been the
victims of a string of stressful experiences' and for the criminal
justice system to continue to disadvantage them is to add insult to
injury.
While the sheer number of juveniles living in non-traditional
homes makes them an important group to protect from police abuse,6"
the need for protection becomes even more crucial when considered
in light of the increased likelihood that juveniles from non-traditional
homes will be charged with crimes. Research has repeatedly shown
that "children who are separated from a biological parent are more
likely to offend than children from intact families."62 If separation
from one biological parent can increase the likelihood of juvenile
delinquency, then separation from both parents is also likely to
increase delinquency, perhaps even to a greater extent.63 "Much
research suggests that frequent changes of parent figures predict
offending by children."'  For instance, a study in Denmark of 500
males "found that divorce followed by changes in parent figures"
made juveniles 65% more likely to be criminally involved.65 Studies
in New Zealand and the U.S. reached similar conclusions in regard to
changes in parental figures.66 The United States Office of the
Surgeon General has also identified "broken homes" and "separation
from parents" as risk factors for juvenile delinquency.67 While
researchers have developed multiple theories to explain the
connection between broken homes and juvenile delinquency, the
theory that research seems to support most is that separation from
60. DAVID P. FARRINGTON & BRANDON C. WELSH, SAVING CHILDREN FROM A
LIFE OF CRIME: EARLY RISK FACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 68-69 (2007)
(noting that stressful experiences include separation from parents and changes in parental
figures).
61. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62. FARRINGTON & WELSH, supra note 60, at 67.
63. Studies indicate that general "parental rejection" tends to lead to juvenile
delinquency. See Stacey E. Holmes, James R. Slaughter & Javad Kashani, Risk Factors in
Childhood That Lead to the Development of Conduct Disorder and Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 31 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 183,187 (2001).
64. FARRINGTON & WELSH, supra note 60, at 68.
65. Id. at 68-69.
66. Id. at 68.
67. Michael Shader, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Risk Factors for Delinquency: An Overview,
at 4, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/frd030127.pdf.
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parents leads to a string of "stressful experiences" that make children
more likely to be antisocial.'
Because children in non-traditional homes are more likely to be
criminally involved and a large number of juveniles in North Carolina
live in non-traditional homes, police officers in North Carolina are
likely to interrogate juveniles from non-traditional homes more often
than children from traditional homes. During an interrogation, these
children from non-traditional homes may try to invoke their right to
speak to a guardian or custodian by asking for their primary caregiver
(such as an aunt). Since the law does not require police officers to
cease the interrogation to discover whether the requested adult is
actually a guardian or custodian, officers are likely to simply deny the
request in order to expedite a confession. This is exactly what
happened in Oglesby.6' Such a situation creates a distinct bias against
juveniles from non-traditional homes.
In addition to making it easier for police officers to violate
juveniles' rights and creating a bias against juveniles from non-
traditional homes, the holding in Oglesby creates a third problem: it
undermines the North Carolina General Assembly's well-founded
policy of special protection for juveniles. The North Carolina
General Assembly explicitly stated that part of the overall purpose of
the Juvenile Code is to "protect the constitutional rights of
juveniles."70 The General Assembly acted on this policy by providing
means of protection beyond the standard Miranda warnings.7
Specifically, juveniles have a right not only to an attorney during an
interrogation, but also to a "parent, guardian, or custodian."" North
Carolina courts have recognized this policy of special protection by
holding that the State's burden to protect a juvenile defendant's rights
is higher than the burden to protect the rights of an adult defendant.73
68. FARRINGTON & WELSH, supra note 60, at 68-70. Antisocial behavior is strongly
linked to criminal behavior. See Holmes, Slaughter, & Kashani, supra note 63, at 183-84.
69. 361 N.C. at 552, 648 S.E.2d at 820 (2007).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1500 (4) (2007).
71. For a discussion of Miranda warnings, see supra note 23.
72. N.C. GENq. STAT. § 7B-2101 (a)(3) (2005).
73. See, e.g., In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 575, 614 S.E.2d 296, 299 (2005) ("Our courts
have consistently recognized that '[t]he [S]tate has a greater duty to protect the rights of a
respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.' "); In re Stallings, 318
N.C. 565, 576, 350 S.E.2d 327, 333 (1986) (Martin, J., dissenting) ("Juveniles are not, after
all, miniature adults. Our criminal justice system recognizes that their immaturity and
vulnerability sometimes warrant protections well beyond those afforded adults."); State v.
Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 24, 305 S.E.2d 685, 699 (1983) (Martin, J., concurring) ("The state has
a greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a
criminal prosecution."); In re Meyers, 25 N.C. App. 555, 558, 214 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1975)
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The Supreme Court of the United States has also recognized the need
for special protection of juvenile's rights during interrogation. For
instance, in Haley v. Ohio,74 the Court opined that "we cannot believe
that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest [as
custodial interrogation]."75  The Court again strongly affirmed the
need for special protection of juveniles when it stated the following in
Gallegos v. Colorado:
76
But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely
to have any conception of what will confront him when he is
made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with
a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and
understanding of the consequences of the questions and
answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to
protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights.77
This policy of special protection is well-founded because of
juveniles' unique vulnerabilities. Juveniles are uniquely vulnerable
for two reasons: (1) they are less likely than adults to understand
their rights; and (2) they are distinctly susceptible to police
interrogation techniques. As to the first vulnerability, research has
revealed that only 20.9% of juveniles understand the standard
Miranda warnings,78 while 42.3% of adults are able to comprehend
these same warnings.7 9 The same study demonstrated that 63.3% of
juveniles completely misunderstand at least one crucial word in the
warnings, as compared to only 37.3% of adults.80 The most common
misunderstanding for both juveniles and adults concerned the right to
have an attorney present-specifically, many did not understand that
the attorney could actually be present during police questioning
("The fact that the present proceeding is not an ordinary criminal prosecution but is a
juvenile proceeding ... does not lessen but should actually increase the burden upon the
State to see that the child's rights were protected.").
74. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
75. Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600.
76. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
77. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54. Given a juvenile's special susceptibility, the best policy
may be to require the presence of a parent, guardian, or custodian during any juvenile
interrogation. See generally Robert E. McGuire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile
Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1355 (2000) (arguing that the presence of a parent, guardian, or legal counsel should
be required in all police interrogations of juveniles).
78. For a general discussion of Miranda rights, see supra note 23.
79. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1153 (1980). The ability to understand Miranda warning
was measured by ability to paraphrase the rights. See id.
80. Id. at 1154
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rather than at some later time.81 A startling 44.8% of juveniles did
not understand what it meant that they had the right to have an
attorney present, while only 14.6% of adults had the same
confusion.' This may indicate that juveniles in North Carolina also
have difficulty understanding that they have the right to have a
parent, guardian, or custodian present during an interrogation rather
than at some later time.83 Additionally, 23.9% of juveniles did not
understand what it means that "statements may be used against them
in a court of law," compared with only 8.5% of adults who did not
understand that part of the Miranda warnings.' These statistics alone
justify the special protection that juveniles are given during police
interrogations.
Buttressing this statistical data is a juvenile's second unique
vulnerability: they are exceptionally vulnerable to police
interrogation techniques. Although many believe that juveniles in
their mid-adolescence are able to make decisions with roughly the
same capacity as adults, there is good reason to question such an
assumption. 5 For example, studies indicate that "adolescents tend to
discount the future more than adults do and to weigh more heavily
short-term consequences of decisions-both risks and benefits-in
making choices."86  Additionally, "adolescents use a risk-reward
calculus that places relatively less weight on risk, in relation to
reward, than that used by adults."87 Research in neuroscience also
strongly points to the conclusion that adolescents are much less able
than adults to engage in "consequential thought," which is essentially
the ability to hold several potential outcomes in mind at once while
sorting through them to pick the most favorable one.88 Adolescents
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. One may consider whether or not this indicates the need to require the presence
of a parent, guardian, or custodian during a custodial interrogation unless the juvenile
explicitly indicates a desire not to have an adult present. See McGuire, supra note 77, at
1381-86. Some states have begun to bolster juvenile rights during interrogation. For
instance, the Ohio Supreme Court held in September of 2007 that a juvenile may not
waive his right to counsel unless he is advised by a parent, guardian, or custodian. In re
C.S., 874 N.E.2d 1177, 1191 (Ohio 2007).
84. Grisso, supra note 79 at 1154.
85. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011 (2003), available at http://youthadvocacyproject.org/
pdfs/PsychologyLessGuilty.pdf.
86. Id. at 1012.
87. Id.
88. Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of Consequential
Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B:
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are also at a disadvantage in relation to adults in that they tend to
respond to at least some information with more of a "gut reaction"
than an analytical approach. 9 The lack of future-orientation, greater
emphasis on reward, inability to think through multiple outcomes,
and tendency to use gut reactions in decision-making can be
especially harmful during police interrogations. In fact, the most
common reason why adolescents falsely confess to crimes is because
they believe that they will get to go home if they confess.9" Studies
have shown that the use of police interrogation tactics such as
repeated, forceful, and suggestive questions increase the likelihood of
a false confession -from a juvenile.9 To make matters worse, police
are often trained to use special psychological tactics with juveniles,
such as blaming a juvenile's parents, friends, or environment.92
While the above studies demonstrate that juveniles as a group
are uniquely vulnerable to police interrogation tactics, they only test
juveniles who are free from mental disorders or other developmental
problems. Juveniles in the criminal justice system are more likely
than other juveniles to have a mental health disorder.9 Some places
in North Carolina exceed the national averages for juveniles with
mental disorders in the juvenile justice system. In Durham County,
for instance, 90% of court-involved youths have a mental disorder. 94
These disorders make it even more difficult for juveniles in high-
pressure police interrogations to understand their rights and make
good decisions rather than simply doing whatever the police tell them
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1797, 1800-01 (2004), available at https://www.lanlfoundation.org/Docs/
Abigail%20Baird.pdf.
89. Frontline, Inside the Teenage Brain: Interview with Deborah Yurgelun-Todd,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html (last
visited Aug. 28, 2008).
90. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2 at 969.
91. Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for
Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 275 (2007).
92. Id.
93. Shay Bilchik, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Mental Health Disorders and Substance Abuse Problems Among
Juveniles (July 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/fs9882.pdf ("It has been
estimated that each year, of the youth who come in contact with the juvenile justice
system, 150,000 meet the diagnostic criteria for at least one mental disorder, 225,000 suffer
from a diagnosable alcohol abuse or dependence disorder, and 95,000 may suffer from a
diagnosable substance abuse or dependence disorder.") (citation omitted).
94. Durham County Government, News Release: Durham County wins Grant to
Build Mental Health-Justice System Collaboration (Oct. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.durhamcountync.gov/departments/publ/NewsReleases/NewsRelease.cfm?ID
=590.
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to do.95 For instance, the fact that Jaamall suffered from a mental
disorder may have made it very difficult for him to understand the
situation during his interrogation."
Because juveniles are less likely than adults to understand their
rights and are also more susceptible to police interrogations, North
Carolina's policy of special protection, manifested by allowing
juveniles to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during
interrogation, is well-founded. Of course, the presence of an
interested adult is not a guarantee that a juvenile's rights will be
protected. In fact, in some instances, the presence of an interested
adult may even be detrimental if the adult encourages the juvenile to
confess or has some interest in the juvenile confessing.97 These
situations aside, however, the presence of an adult is likely to assist
the juvenile in understanding her rights and in making good decisions
during the interrogation.9" Many courts have recognized this by
ruling that waivers of juvenile rights are more likely to be voluntary if
there is a parent present.99 Besides helping the juvenile make wise
decisions, the mere presence of an interested adult, such as a parent
or guardian, can also ease the tension and fear that may affect a
juvenile during an interrogation by providing the juvenile with an
authority figure who is on his side."' This solves the problem of false
confessions that result from a juvenile's eagerness to please an
95. See Richard Rogers et al., Knowing and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings
in Mentally Disordered Defendants, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 416 (2007) (concluding
based on empirical evidence that "even the highest quartile of mental disordered
offenders have limited comprehension of the Miranda warnings"). See generally THOMAS
GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS
(2006) (discussing the pressing problem of juvenile offenders with mental disorders in the
criminal justice system); William C. Follette, Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, Mental
Health Status and Vulnerability to Police Interrogation Tactics, 22 CRIM. JUST. 42 (2007)
(exploring why individuals with mental disorders are particularly susceptible to police
interrogation techniques).
96. See supra note 5-11 and accompanying text.
97. Kenneth, J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to
Protect Children From Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda
Rights, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 431, 468-69. The phenomenon of a parent or other interested
adult encouraging a juvenile to confess may result from "earnest attempts at teaching the
child to be responsible; a belief that children should not have the right to remain silent; or
any number of other reasons, including that the parent's interests, in some manner,
conflict with the child's." Id. at 469 (footnote omitted). This exact problem was an issue
in State v. Jones, 147 N.C. App. 527, 556 S.E.2d 644 (2001), where the juvenile defendant's
guardian, who was his aunt, was present during the interrogation and seemed to intimidate
the juvenile into confessing in order to protect her brother who was also a suspect. Id. at
533-39, 556 S.E.2d at 649-52.
98. See McGuire, supra note 77, at 1381-82.
99. See King, supra note 97, at 462-64.
100. See Grisso, supra note 79, at 1163.
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authority figure such as a police officer."1 Given North Carolina's
policy for special protection of juvenile defendants,"2 it follows that
when a defendant asks for an individual who is not immediately
identifiable as a guardian or custodian, the interrogation should cease
immediately and officers should determine whether that person
qualifies as a guardian or custodian. The law is inconsistent if it
acknowledges the need for juveniles to be afforded special
protection 3 but does not safeguard that protection at the moment
the juvenile is most vulnerable.
One might object that requiring police officers to cease an
interrogation in order to determine whether a requested adult is a
guardian or custodian may be overly burdensome on police officers.
For instance, it may slow down the interrogation process and make a
confession more difficult to obtain. However, for good reason, the
presence of a guardian or custodian is a statutory right in North
Carolina." 4 One could argue that the requirement may hinder police
officers from doing their job of protecting the public from criminal
acts. But not requiring police officers to make such a determination
may in fact be counter-productive to the goal of protecting the public
from crime.1"5 Allowing police officers to continue to deny requests
to speak to an adult who is not immediately identifiable as a guardian
or custodian without requiring them to determine the status of the
individual will likely lead to denials of requests for adults who are
actually guardians or custodians." 6 This kind of denial is likely to
result in a confession being barred from admission into evidence at
trial,0 7 which means that convictions of guilty juveniles will be more
difficult to obtain since a confession is often a crucial piece of
evidence." 8 Recidivism rates from North Carolina show that once a
juvenile has been involved in a criminal adjudication (although not
necessarily convicted), that juvenile is fairly likely to commit another
101. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 91, at 275.
102. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 70-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the North
Carolina General Assembly's policy of special protection of juveniles is well-founded.
105. According to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1500 (1) (2007), one of the purposes of the
Juvenile Code is to "protect the public from acts of delinquency."
106. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
108. See Anthony X. McDermott & H. Mitchell Caldwell, Did He or Didn't He? The
Effect of Dickerson on the Post-Waiver Invocation Equation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 870-
71 (describing the significance of confessions in obtaining convictions).
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crime within the next three years."° Therefore, if a juvenile commits
one crime and goes free as a result of his confession being barred, he
is fairly likely to commit another crime. The result is that the criminal
justice system fails to protect the public from crimes. This
contravenes the North Carolina General Assembly's stated purpose
of "protect[ing] the public from acts of delinquency." 10 The policy of
not requiring police officers to determine whether an adult requested
by a juvenile during an interrogation is a guardian or custodian not
only fails to protect juvenile rights but may also fail to protect the
public from juvenile delinquency. Therefore, it is fitting to consider
how the law might be amended to remedy this problem.
Since the Supreme Court of North Carolina has chosen not to
recognize the importance of requiring police officers to cease an
interrogation to determine formally whether an adult requested by a
juvenile during an interrogation is a guardian,"' the North Carolina
General Assembly should act to remedy this problem. The problem
could be solved with an amendment that requires police to cease an
interrogation when a juvenile asks to speak to an individual who is
not immediately identifiable as a parent, guardian, or custodian in
order to determine whether the individual falls into any of those
categories. This proposed amendment should also include a
definition of the word "guardian" since the Juvenile Code does not
define the term. Additionally, drafters should consider adding and
defining "caretaker" to the list of adults whose presence a juvenile
has a right to during a custodial interrogation. Finally, drafters
should also consider adding a provision that requires police officers to
explain to a juvenile why a particular request was denied.
As to the initial amendment, the language could be as simple as
the following:
If a juvenile asks at any time to speak to an individual who is
not immediately identifiable as a parent, guardian, or custodian,
the officer shall cease questioning in order to determine if the
requested individual is a parent, guardian, or custodian."
Such an amendment raises the important issue of how to define the
terms "guardian" and "custodian." Fortunately, the Juvenile Code
109. North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
North Carolina Recidivism Report: A Follow-up Study of Juveniles Adjudicated
Delinquent for A-E Felonies in 1999, at 8 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/
resources/statistics-legislative/2002_Recidivism.pdf (concluding that 21% of juvenile
offenders adjudicated for A-E felonies recidivated within the three year follow-up period).
110. § 7B-1500(1).
111. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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already defines "custodian," and the courts have to some extent
already proposed a definition of "guardian." Regarding "custodian,"
the subchapter of the Juvenile Code governing undisciplined and
delinquent juveniles defines a custodian as "[t]he person or agency
that has been awarded legal custody of a juvenile by a court. 11 2
Because "guardian" has been defined to some extent by the
courts, the following paragraphs will explain how the courts have
reached that definition and will propose a way to statutorily codify
the definition. The Oglesby court stated that the rules of statutory
construction require the court to construe unambiguous statutory
words that are not statutorily defined according to their plain
meaning without considering legislative intent.'13 This reasoning is
supported by a long history of North Carolina cases requiring that
statutory words that are not defined by the statute be accorded their
"plain and definite meaning" as long as the words are "clear and
unambiguous. '"114 "Clear and unambiguous" has been defined as
meaning that the word has a "single, definite, and sensible
meaning.""' 5 Only if the word in question is ambiguous may the
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501 (6) (2007). The subchapter of the Juvenile Code
governing abuse, neglect, and dependency defines custodian more broadly as "[t]he
person or agency that has been awarded legal custody of a juvenile by a court or a person,
other than parents or legal guardian, who has assumed the status and obligation of a
parent without being awarded the legal custody of a juvenile by a court." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-101 (8) (2007). Black's Law Dictionary defines custodian even more broadly
as follows: "[a] person or institution that has charge or custody (of a child, property,
papers, or other valuables) .... In reference to a child, a custodian has either legal or
physical custody." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 412 (8th ed. 1999).
113. State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 555-56, 648 S.E.2d 819, 822 (2007). For a
discussion of the conflict between the text of the law and the spirit of the law, see generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998)
(discussing Justice Scalia and the new textualism); John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (discussing whether there is
a meaningful distinction between textualism and purposivism); John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001) (questioning
whether the doctrine of the equity of the statute is meaningful threat to textualism);
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231 (1990) (discussing why the Supreme Court of the United
States has moved toward a textualist approach).
114. See Spruill v. Lake Phelps Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 322, 523
S.E.2d 672, 675 (2000); see also Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cobey, 342 N.C.
838, 843, 467 S.E.2d 675, 678-79 (1996); Woodson v. Rowland 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407
S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991); Am. Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 311 N.C. 311, 318, 317 S.E.2d
351, 357 (1984); Appeal of Martin, 286 N.C. 66, 77, 209 S.E.2d 766, 774 (1974).
115. Food Town Stores, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 300 N.C. 21, 36, 265 S.E.2d 123, 132
(1980); see also State Highway Comm'n v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 539, 153 S.E.2d 22, 26
(1967); Mascot Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Turnage 183 N.C. 137, 137, 110 S.E. 779, 780 (1922).
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courts look to statutory intent."6 The court in Oglesby posits that
"guardian" has a "clear and unambiguous" meaning as "[o]ne who
has the legal authority and duty to care for another's person or
property" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary."7 Besides Oglesby,
the North Carolina courts have twice defined guardian according to
the definition in Black's Law Dictionary" 8 and have never accorded
the word a contrary definition. Additionally, no North Carolina
Statutes provide a definition of "guardian. '"19 Because the law in
North Carolina has provided a "single, definite, and sensible
meaning" of the word guardian, the North Carolina courts are not at
liberty to look beyond that definition.20 Therefore, the courts
continue to interpret guardian as "[o]ne who has the legal authority
and duty to care for another's person or property."''
However, this definition does not explain how to determine
when an individual has "the legal authority and duty" to care for a
116. Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473, 479, 164 S.E.2d 2, 6-7 (1968); In re
Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 694, 127 S.E.2d 584, 591 (1962); Victory Cab Co. v. Charlotte,
234 N.C. 572, 576, 68 S.E.2d 433,436 (1951).
117. Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 555-56, 648 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 566 (abr. 7th ed. 2000)).
118. In re A.M.H., No. COA04-188, 2005 WL 1020862, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. May 3,
2005); State v. Jones, 147 N.C. App. 527, 534, 556 S.E.2d 644, 649 (2001).
119. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1202 (7) does define the term "general guardian" as "a
guardian of both the estate and the person." Number (8) of the same section defines
"guardian ad litem" as "a guardian appointed pursuant to G.S. 1A-l, Rule 17, Rules of
Civil Procedure." Number (9) defines "guardian of the estate" as "a guardian appointed
solely for the purpose of managing the property, estate, and business affairs of a ward,"
and number (10) of the same section defines "guardian of the person" as "a guardian
appointed solely for the purpose of performing duties relating to the care, custody, and
control of ward." However, neither this statute nor any other North Carolina statute
defines the underlying term "guardian." The closest any statute comes to giving a
functional definition of the word "guardian" is in describing the duties of a guardian who
has been appointed by the courts:
The guardian shall have the care, custody, and control of the juvenile or may
arrange a suitable placement for the juvenile and may represent the juvenile in
legal actions before any court. The guardian may consent to certain actions on the
part of the juvenile in place of the parent including (i) marriage, (ii) enlisting in the
armed forces, and (iii) enrollment in school. The guardian may also consent to any
necessary remedial, psychological, medical, or surgical treatment for the juvenile.
The authority of the guardian shall continue until the guardianship is terminated
by court order, until the juvenile is emancipated pursuant to Article 35 of
Subchapter IV of this Chapter, or until the juvenile reaches the age of majority.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-600(a) (2007).
120. See Food Town Stores, Inc., 300 N.C. at 36, 265 S.E.2d at 132.
121. Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 555-56, 648 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 566 (abr. 7th ed. 2000)).
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juvenile. In State v. Jones,122 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
held that this kind of legal authority and duty can still exist for
purposes of section 7B-2101(a)(3) of the North Carolina General
Statutes, even if authority has not been explicitly vested on an
individual by the courts. In Jones, the court stated that an individual
is a juvenile's guardian if legal authority has been conferred by any
branch of the government, such as a local school system or the
Department of Social Services. 23 The majority opinion in Oglesby
seems to accept this approach by noting that the defendant's aunt
"never had custody of defendant, that defendant had only stayed with
her on occasion but not for any considerable length of time, and that
she had never signed any school papers for him."124 The negative
inference is that if these things had been different, the aunt may have
been considered to have legal authority and thus been a guardian for
the purposes of the interrogation as was the case in Jones. This
understanding of legal authority is appropriate since defining
guardian as merely an adult who has been vested with legal authority
by the courts would essentially be the same definition of "custodian"
as provided by the Juvenile Code.125
Because the precedents of statutory construction are able to
satisfactorily produce definitions for the term "guardian," there is no
real need for the North Carolina General Assembly to create a
different definition for the purpose of juvenile interrogation.
However, in order to clarify the definition, especially for police
officers who must apply the definitions, codifying a definition in
statutory form would be helpful to ensuring proper procedures. A
suggested codification is as follows:
A guardian is an adult who has been conferred legal authority
to care for a juvenile's person. Legal authority can be
conferred directly by the court system or indirectly by any
governmental agency that recognizes the adult's authority over
the juvenile.
The North Carolina General Assembly should also consider an
additional amendment to the statute including the term "caretaker"
122. 147 N.C. App. at 540, 556 S.E.2d at 652.
123. Id. This understanding of guardian may be understood as akin to a recognition of
"construction authority," which Black's Law Dictionary defines as "[aluthority that is
inferred because of an earlier grant of authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (7th
ed. 1999).
124. Oglesby, 361 N.C. at 556, 648 S.E.2d at 822.
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501 (6) (2007) (defining "custodian" as "[t]he person or
agency that has been awarded legal custody of a juvenile by a court").
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in the list of individuals whose presence a juvenile has a right to
during an interrogation. This addition would address situations in
which an adult has too recently taken responsibility for a juvenile to
be recognized by any governmental agency. These kinds of situations
may very well be a problem because of the large number of juveniles
in North Carolina who are not living with their parents and not
supervised by the Department of Social Services. '26 A suggested
definition of "caretaker" is as follows:
Any person other than a parent, guardian, or custodian who has
taken responsibility for the welfare of a juvenile by providing
for the juvenile's needs by supplying food, shelter, and other
essentials.'27
The above suggested amendments to the statute will be
beneficial by not only helping to protect juvenile rights during an
interrogation but also by assisting police officers in determining when
a juvenile is entitled to have a requested adult present. When
determining whether a requested individual is a guardian, custodian,
or caretaker, police officers should ask the juvenile questions
regarding whether a court has appointed the adult as a guardian,
whether the juvenile lives with the requested adult, whether the adult
provides for the juvenile's needs, and whether the adult has ever
signed school papers for the juvenile. Admittedly, such a
determination will create some inconvenience for police officers and
may require the courts to affirm or overrule the officer's
determination at a later time. However, as discussed above, the
alternative creates even bigger problems.
Although the amendments will have the effect of increasing
juvenile rights, they also may raise new issues for law enforcement.
For instance, what (if anything) should police officers do if they
determine that the requested individual is not a guardian or
custodian? Without any direct statutory directive, police officers will
not be required to do more than simply grant or deny the request
after they have made a determination regarding the status of the
126. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
127. The Juvenile Code subchapter dealing with abused, neglected, and dependent
juveniles defines caretaker as "[a]ny person other than a parent, guardian, or custodian
who has responsibility for the health and welfare of a juvenile in a residential setting."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(3) (2007). The proposed definition is purposefully different
than the definition in § 7B-101(3) in which the purpose is to protect juveniles from
potential abuse by a caretaker. The proposed definition suggests that any individual who
purposefully takes responsibility by caring for a juvenile's needs may be considered a
caretaker.
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requested adult. A denial of the request without an explanation to
the juvenile as to why the request is being denied is problematic
because of juvenile's unique vulnerabilities."z  Therefore, a wise
amendment would also include a provision requiring police officers to
explain to a juvenile why a request for a particular adult has been
denied. Such an amendment might be something like the following:
If a police officer determines that an adult requested by a
juvenile is not a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker, and
therefore denies the juvenile's request to speak to the adult, the
police officer must explain to the juvenile why the adult does
not fall into any of the statutory categories.
In order to avoid the slew of problems discussed in this Recent
Development, the North Carolina General Assembly has the duty to
require police officers to determine whether an adult whom a juvenile
requests during an interrogation falls into the category of parent,
guardian, or custodian. To fully ensure that such an amendment
would be effectively applied, the General Assembly should also
codify the definition of guardian, consider adding the category of
caretaker, and require that police officers who deny a juvenile's
request to speak to an adult explain why that person does not fit into
any of the categories.
One may wonder if Jaamall Oglesby ever committed the crime
he confessed to or if he simply told the officers what they wanted to
hear so that he could speak to his aunt.129 We will never know if
things would have been different if, when Jaamall asked to speak to
his aunt, police officers had ceased the interrogation in order to
determine whether his aunt was a "guardian" or "custodian." The
drama of Jaamall's ordeal may have taken a different turn if police
officers had explained to Jaamall why his aunt was not a "guardian"
or "custodian," thus giving him the chance to request the presence of
another adult who may have helped him understand the significance
of the situation. It is too late for Jaamall, but it is not too late for the
thousands of other juveniles who come from non-traditional homes. 130
These juveniles are at a high risk of being involved in the criminal
justice system,"' and it is that system's duty to diligently protect their
rights. It is useless to provide juveniles with special protection by
allowing a parent, guardian, or custodian to be present during the
128. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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interrogation, but ignore that promise of protection when the most
vulnerable juveniles are involved.
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